This important book testifies to the 'enactive' viewpoint in cognitive science having now come of age. In arguing that minds lack informational content, Hutto and Myin develop an original version of the enactive view that reshapes current philosophical thinking about embodied and extended cognition. Both proponents and critics of the enactive viewpoint will need to come to terms with this new enactive manifesto. -- Evan Thompson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto Most books that try to push the conceptual envelope tend to sacrifice analytic rigor for clarity of vision. That is surely not the case in Radicalizing Enactivism. Hutto and Myin defend a position that pushes ideas that most people think are a few steps too far several steps farther. The fact that their genuinely radical conclusions are supported by dense analytical argumentation makes the book a serious challenge to the status quo in the philosophy of mind. -- Anthony Chemero, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati; author of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
Daniel D. Hutto is Professor of Philosophical Psychology at the
University of Wollongong and the author of Folk Psychological
Narratives-The Sociocultural Basis for Understanding Reasons (MIT
Press) and coauthor of Radicalizing Enactivism- Basic Minds without
Content (MIT Press).
Erik Myin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Antwerp
and coauthor of Radicalizing Enactivism- Basic Minds without
Content (MIT Press).
Anyone who is familiar with the field will be rewarded by reading
Radicalizing Enactivism. The book engages philosophers on both
sides of the representationalist/anti-representationalist divide
with well-structured, compelling argument; and the original style
makes reading enjoyable.—Philosophical Psychology
Based on a thorough and rigorous criticism of classical and
contemporary analytical theories of content, including those which
claim to be compatible with enactivism, the authors brilliantly
point out endemic problems impeding the representationalist
tradition. Their presentation of some domains of application of
non-representationalism, and their development of the consequences
of radical enactivism for debates about phenomenal consciousness
and extended cognition, equally show, in my opinion in a remarkable
way, the plausibility and relevance of their approach. For these
contributions alone, the book is worth reading, both by supporters
of the classical approach and by advocates of other forms
enactivism.—Intellectica
Provocative... compelling... their critical attack on traditional
theories of content provides a justification for enactivist
radicalism.—Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
One of the most original contributions to the already vast
literature in recent philosophy of mind.... No collection in modern
philosophy of mind is complete without this ground breaking
book.—Choice
This book is a (witty and engagingly written) manifesto with a true
revolutionary feel to it.—Jakub Matyja, Constructivist
Foundations
The main merit of the book is that it shows that the work done so
far in the project of naturalizing content is insufficient; it
provides a powerful critical assessment of the current state of
play in cognitive science and recent analytic philosophy of mind.
Furthermore, the book pushes the boundaries and scope of enactivism
as currently defended and suggests that a radical turn is in the
cards for its advocators....opens the door to a full new program of
research within the cognitive sciences.—The Philosophical
Quarterly
Radicalizing Enactivism is an original contribution to the debate,
well-written and highly recommended to anyone interested in these
issues....a rich and stimulating book.—Philosophy
If you are interested in the enactivist or embodiment camps and
have been wondering what firm philosophical foundation might be
laid to support this movement for the long haul, look no
further.—PsycCritiques
This is a little book which offers so much. It is witty, well
written and structured, and should be accessible to those
unfamiliar with these debates as well as informative and
provocative to those who are. Anyone with even the slightest
interest in theoretical cognitive science cannot afford to ignore
the issues raised herein.—Journal of Cognitive Computing
|
Ask a Question About this Product More... |
|
