Foreword XV
Preface XVII
About the Editors XIX
List of Contributors XXIII
Part I History and Treaties in CBRN -- Warfare and Terrorism 1
1 A Glance Back -- Myths and Facts about CBRN Incidents
3
Andre Richardt and Frank Sabath
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 History of Chemical Warfare 4
1.3 Introduction to Biological Warfare 13
1.4 Introduction to Radiological and Nuclear Warfare 22
2 International Treaties -- Only a Matter for Diplomats?
39
Martin Schaarschmidt
2.1 Introduction to the Minefield of Negotiations 39
2.2 Why It Is so Difficult to Implement International Regulations? 42
2.3 Historic Development of Treaties -- the Link to the Incidents 46
2.4 Today's System of Treaties -- a Global Network 47
2.5 Nuclear Weapons 54
2.6 Organizations 63
2.7 Conclusions and Where Does the Road Lead? 64
Part II CBRN Characteristics -- Is There Something Inimitable? 67
3 Chemical Agents -- Small Molecules with Deadly Properties
69
Hans-Jurgen Altmann, Silke Oelze, and Bernd Niemeyer
3.1 Are Special Properties Required for Chemical Warfare Agents? 69
3.2 How can we Classify Chemical Warfare Agents? 71
3.3 Properties of Chemical Warfare Agents 78
3.4 Choking and Irritant Agents 97
3.5 Incapacitating Agents 99
3.6 Dissemination Systems of Chemical Warfare Agents 99
3.7 Conclusions and Outlook 101
4 Characteristics of Biological Warfare Agents -- Diversity
of Biology 103
Birgit Hulseweh
4.1 What Is Special? 104
4.2 Types of Biological Agents 104
4.3 Risk Classification of Biological and Biological Warfare Agents 110
4.4 Routes of Entry 114
4.5 Origin, Spreading, and Availability 118
4.6 The Biological Event -- Borderline to Pandemics, Endemics, and Epidemics 121
4.7 The Bane of Biotechnology -- Genetically Engineered Pathogens 121
4.8 Conclusions and Outlook 123
5 Characteristics of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons
125
Ronald Rambousky and Frank Sabath
5.1 Introduction to Nuclear Explosions 126
5.2 Direct Effects 133
5.3 Indirect Effects 149
5.4 Radiological Weapons 159
Part III CBRN Sensors -- Key Technology for an Effective CBRN Countermeasure Strategy 167
6 Why Are Reliable CBRN Detector Technologies Needed?
169
Birgit Hulseweh, Hans-Jurgen Marschall, Ronald Rambousky, and Andre
Richardt
6.1 Introduction 169
6.2 A Concept to Track CBRN Substances 170
6.3 Low-Level Exposure and Operational Risk Management 175
6.4 Conclusions and Outlook 177
7 Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents -- Searching for
Molecules 179
Andre Richardt, Martin Jung, and Bernd Niemeyer
7.1 Analytical Chemistry -- the Scientific Basis for Searching Molecules 180
7.2 Standards for Chemical Warfare Agent Sensor Systems and Criteria for Deployment 182
7.3 False Alarm Rate and Limit of Sensitivity 184
7.4 Technologies for Chemical Warfare Agent Sensor Systems 185
7.5 Testing of Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors 203
7.6 Conclusions and Future Developments 206
8 Detection and Analysis of Biological Agents 211
Birgit Hulseweh and Hans-Jurgen Marschall
8.1 What Makes the Difference? 212
8.2 The Ideal Detection and Identification Platform 215
8.3 Bioaerosols: Particulate and Biological Background 216
8.4 Aerosol Detection -- A Tool for Threat Monitoring 217
8.5 Sampling of Biological Agents 223
8.6 Identification of Biological Warfare Agents 229
8.7 Developing and Upcoming Technologies 238
8.8 Conclusions 239
9 Measurement of Ionizing Radiation 243
Ronald Rambousky
9.1 Why Is Detection of Ionizing Radiation So Important? 244
9.2 Physical Quantities used to Describe Radioactivity and Ionizing Radiation 248
9.3 Different Measuring Tasks Concerning Ionizing Radiation 251
9.4 Basics of Radiation Detectors 256
9.5 Gamma Dose Rate and Detection of Gamma Radiation 266
9.6 Conclusions and Outlook 271
Part IV Technologies for Physical Protection 273
10 Filter Technology -- Clean Air is Required 275
Andre Richardt and Thomas Dawert
10.1 Filters -- Needed Technology Equipment for Collective and Individual Protection 275
10.2 General Considerations 276
10.3 What are the Principles for Filtration and Air-Cleaning? 278
10.4 Test Methods 286
10.5 Selection Process for CBRN Filters 290
10.6 Conclusions and Outlook 292
11 Individual Protective Equipment -- Do You Know What to
Wear? 295
Karola Hagner and Friedrich Hesse
11.1 Basics of Individual Protection 296
11.2 Which Challenges for Individual Protection Equipment (IPE) Can Be Identified? 296
11.3 The Way to Design Individual Protective Equipment 298
11.4 Function 299
11.5 Ergonomics -- a Key Element for Individual Protection Equipment 301
11.6 Donning and Doffing -- Training Is Required 305
11.7 Overview of IPE Items -- They Have to Act in Concert 306
11.8 Quality Assurance 326
11.9 Workplace Safety 327
11.10 Future Prospects 327
12 Collective Protection -- A Secure Area in a Toxic
Environment 331
Andre Richardt and Bernd Niemeyer
12.1 Why Is Collective Protection of Interest? 332
12.2 Collective Protection Systems -- Required for Different Scenarios 337
12.3 Basic Design 341
12.4 Conclusions and Outlook 348
Part V Cleanup after a CBRN Event 351
13 Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Agents -- What is
Thorough? 353
Hans Jurgen Altmann, Martin Jung, and Andre Richardt
13.1 What Is Decontamination? 353
13.2 Dispersal and Fate of Chemical Warfare Agents 354
13.3 Decontamination Media for Chemical Warfare Agents 356
13.4 Selected Chemical Warfare Agents and Decont Reaction Schemes 369
13.5 Soman (GD) 372
13.6 VX 372
13.7 Catalysis in Decontamination 373
13.8 Decont Procedures 375
13.9 Conclusions and Outlook 380
14 Principles and Practice of Disinfection of Biological
Warfare Agents -- How Clean is Clean Enough? 383
Andre Richardt and Birgit Hulseweh
14.1 General Principles of Disinfection and Decontamination 384
14.2 Mechanisms of Action of Biocides against Microorganisms 385
14.3 Levels of Disinfection 390
14.4 Biological Target Sites of Selected Biocides 393
14.5 The Spores Problem 395
14.6 Inactivation as Kinetic Process 399
14.7 Evaluation of Antimicrobial Efficiency 401
14.8 Carrier Tests versus Suspension Tests 403
14.9 Resistance to Biocide Inactivation -- a Growing Concern 405
14.10 New and Emerging Technologies for Disinfection 408
14.11 "Is Clean Clean Enough'' or "How Clean Is Clean Enough''? 408
15 Radiological/Nuclear Decontamination -- Reduce the Risk
411
Nikolaus Schneider
15.1 Why Is Radiological/Nuclear Decontamination So Special? 412
15.2 Contamination 414
15.3 Decontamination 418
15.4 Conclusions and Outlook 428
Part VI CBRN Risk Management -- Are We Prepared to Respond? 431
16 Preparedness 433
Marc-Michael Blum, Andre Richardt, and Kai Kehe
16.1 Introduction to Risk Management 433
16.2 Key Elements Influencing a Counter-CBRN Strategy 436
16.3 A Special Strategy for CBRN 438
16.4 Proliferation Prevention 456
16.5 Active Countermeasures 458
16.6 If Things Get Real: Responding to a CBRN Event 459
16.7 Research 473
16.8 Aftermath Action -- Lessons Learned 474
16.9 Conclusions and Outlook 475
References 476
Index 479
Andre Richardt is the head of Biological and ChemicalDecontamination at the German Armed Forces Institute for ProtectionTechnologies in Munster, Germany. He is also a lecturer at theHelmut Schmidt University in Hamburg, Germany. Birgit Hulseweh is a senior scientist at the GermanArmed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies. In addition toher research activities she is lecturing on BC-detection at theHelmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg, Germany. Bernd Niemeyer is Professor for Process Engineering at theHelmut Schmidt University in Hamburg, Germany and head of aresearch group at the GKSS National Research Center in Geesthacht,Germany. Frank Sabath is the head of the Electromagnetic EffectsBranch of the German Armed Forces Institute for ProtectionTechnologies. He is also lecturing at the Leibniz University inHannover, Germany.
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