Preface 1: John Campbell: The Historical Background 2: John Campbell: A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley's Puzzle 3: John Campbell: Experiencing Objects as Mind-Independent 4: John Campbell: The Role of Sensory Experience in Propositional Knowledge 5: Quassim Cassam: Berkeley's Puzzle 6: Quassim Cassam: Experientialism 7: Quassim Cassam: The Relational View of Experience 8: Quassim Cassam: Representationalism Campbell's Epilogue Cassam's Epilogue References Index
Quassim Cassam is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. He was previously Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, Professor of Philosophy at University College London, and also taught for many years at Oxford University. He is the author of Self and World (1997) and The Possibility of Knowledge (2007), both published by Oxford University Press. John Campbell is Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. Before that he was Wilde Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He is the author of Past, Space and Self (MIT, 1994) and Reference and Consciousness (OUP, 2002).
`It is only if we understand experience as representing mind-independent reality, Cassam argues, that we can understand how experience can ground our thought of the world as mind-independent. Berkeley's Puzzle contains extensive discussion of how these views differ, and substantive arguments on each side. Written in a clear and unfussy style, it is a major contribution to the current debate in the philosophy of perception between relational and representational views of perception.' Craig French, The Times Literary Supplement `Campbell and Cassam each offer elegant "solutions" to Berkeley's puzzle.' Jane O'Grady, Times Higher Education `this book will prove very useful for advanced graduate students and faculty who do research on Berkeley, the history of empiricism, the theory of perception, and epistemology . . . Recommended. Graduate students and researchers/faculty.' M. A. Michael, CHOICE `Though there are many excellent discussions of relationalism and representationalism, I am unaware of any that is superior to this joint effort . . . Its discussions are guided by genuine insight about which philosophical questions are valuable to engage and their responses to these questions involve an unusually high clarity of thought and attention to detail. The result surpasses what either author would have achieved independently and should serve as a useful model for other philosophers to emulate.' Christopher Frey, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews